![]() In particular, the heavy strain on its armed forces has forced France to join partnerships that are operationally orientated. Since quick and decisive action is impossible within the circle of 27 EU member states, Macron prioritised flexible goal-orientated formats over the expansion of the CSDP as long ago as September 2017. Macron declared that NATO was politically “brain dead” since it was, in his opinion, not equipped to address key aspects of European security. In 2019 this changed view of international relations and of his own room for manoeuvre led the French president to reshape France’s relationship with Russia. Otherwise, it will become a mere “bargaining chip” for the two superpowers USA and China. According to one of these assumptions, France can only remain effective within and via European political decision-making: Europe – which, for Macron, does not necessarily mean the EU – must be enabled to decide its own fate independently. These changed assumptions recognise that the US is withdrawing from Europe at a time when the French government’s ability to act is limited. Since 2017 President Macron has imposed changes in the basic assumptions underpinning France’s security and defence policy. The findings of this research are as follows: The paper explores six case studies in which Germany was annoyed by its partner’s policy under President Macron: France’s attitude in Libya France’s reshaped policy on Russia its confrontational relations with Turkey its criticism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) its questioning of Franco-German proposals for developing the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its overt disparagement of Germany’s policy within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, this collective research paper finds the main cause of the almost total lack of progress in furthering Franco-German cooperation to be the countries’ differing interpretation and weighting of structural changes in international relations. Conversely, Berlin laments Macron’s various solo efforts in foreign, security and EU policy, and his occasionally disruptive political style. Too often, it is claimed, the government has not responded to proposals by the French president. On both sides of the Rhine, the German government’s reticence is primarily held to be responsible for this. However, four years after Macron’s inauguration and two years after the conclusion of the Aachen Treaty, it is evident that this aspiration has rarely been realised in foreign and security policy and in certain areas of EU policy. In 2019 the two countries committed themselves in the Aachen Treaty to deepening cooperation in foreign, security and EU policy. The findings presented here will be complemented by case studies on Libya, the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, Russia, NATO, and Turkey.įrench President Emmanuel Macron has announced that he wants to revitalise Franco-German relations and forge a “new partnership” between Paris and Berlin. The Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly needs to urge the executive of both countries to fulfil the Élysée Treaty and the Aachen Treaty. Second, they must refrain from national solo efforts and be sensitive to the other’s pressure points in foreign, security and Europe policy. The two governments need to discuss openly to what extent their national interests are concerned, and then determine concrete measures. ![]() The first precondition for intensifying bilateral cooperation is for Paris and Berlin to conduct a comprehensive review of the international conflict situation in their existing cooperation formats as regards foreign and security policy. Reconciling bilateral interests is also complicated by national solo efforts, indifference, and inadequate exchange of experience. Berlin emphasises the development of NATO and the EU as fundamental organisations for German foreign policy. Paris is looking for new ways of preserving its autonomy in defence policy and of filling the strategic vacuum that has been created by the waning US interest in Europe and its periphery. The main reasons are structural changes in international relations, which the French and German sides have reacted to differently. However, in foreign and security policy, and in certain areas of his Europe policy, this aspiration has rarely been fulfilled. French President Emmanuel Macron has announced his goal of revitalising Franco-German relations and founding a “new partnership” between Paris and Berlin.
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